China's deepening engagement in the global trading system and the threat of its export capacity have affected the negotiation, formation, and rules of international trade agreements. Among other changes, China's 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) introduced new allowances for existing members to deviate from core WTO principles of reciprocity and most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment by giving existing members access to a discriminatory, import-restricting China safeguard based on the threat of "trade deflection." This paper asks whether there is historical evidence that imposing discriminatory trade restrictions against China during its pre-accession period led to Chinese exports surging to alternative markets. To examine this question, we use a newly constructed data set of product-level, discriminatory trade policy actions imposed on Chinese exports to two of its largest destination markets over the 1992-2001 period. Perhaps surprisingly, we find no systematic evidence that either U.S. or EU imposition of such import restrictions during this period deflected Chinese exports to alternative destinations. To the contrary, we provide evidence that such import restrictions may have a chilling effect on China's exports of these products to secondary markets -i.e., the conditional mean U.S. antidumping duty on China is associated with a 20 percentage point reduction in the relative growth rate of China's targeted exports. We explore explanations for these puzzling results as well as potential implications for the sustainability of the rules of the world trading system.
Introduction
China's entry into global markets has had an important effect on the rules of the world trading system.
After close to fifteen years of negotiations that began under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), China was finally granted membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. While China's accession to the organization was heralded as a significant achievement for trade policy negotiators, its terms of accession introduced new allowances for existing members to deviate from historic and core GATT/WTO principles. In particular, the commitment that members adhere to the fundamental rules of reciprocity and most-favored nation (MFN) treatment, the second of which is also referred to as nondiscriminatory treatment across trading partners, was substantially weakened through the introduction of a newly available "China safeguard" import-restricting policy instrument.
A political justification for the new safeguard was that China's export capacity threatened to disrupt established trade patterns. Furthermore, an unprecedented statutory trigger for use of the import restriction is the phenomenon of "trade deflection," i.e., where a second country's imports from China surge because of a first country imposing its own trade restriction that shut Chinese exports out of its market. This paper empirically investigates whether there is historical evidence that the imposition of discriminatory import restrictions on Chinese trade deflected Chinese exports to secondary markets during its pre-accession period. Since the discriminatory China safeguard was not in use during this period, we address the question by matching data on Chinese exports to roughly forty destination markets to a new dataset of discriminatory antidumping measures imposed on China by two of its most important trading partners. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate whether Chinese exports have been deflected to alternative markets when hit with discriminatory trade restrictions. Prior research investigating related questions has found evidence of such trade deflection; nevertheless, the prior evidence has not investigated Chinese exports, as it has been limited to the examination of exports from other countries and/or is focused on specific industries. 1 WTO members created a "Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism" that can be used against imports from China until 2014 under Section 16 of China's terms of accession (WTO, 2001) .
Many characteristics of the new China safeguard are at odds with core WTO principles and estab- 1 In work motivated by the EU's 2002 global safeguard policy on steel which invoked a similar concern over trade deflection emanating from the U.S. steel safeguard (EU, 2002), Bown and Crowley (2007) find substantial evidence that the imposition of administered import-restricting trade policies against Japanese exports led to export surges to alternative markets. Durling and Prusa's (2006) investigation of global exports from the hot rolled steel market provides some evidence for trade deflection, as does Debaere's (2005) investigation of the shrimp market in response to the EU's discriminatory revocation of GSP status for Thai exporters. injury) to its own domestic industry. This is a substantial difference from all other WTO-authorized import restrictions, which require some evidence and impose a nontrivial resource and political cost on a country seeking to limit the market access previously granted to another WTO member. 5 This policy is based on the now codified provision that there exists a substantial threat that one country's China safeguard will deflect Chinese exports to a secondary market.
Thus far, the most public battles over use of the new China safeguard focused on the U.S. and EU imposing import restrictions on fair trade from China in the textile and clothing sectors in 2005. 6 Nevertheless, any WTO member can impose a China safeguard on any of China's exported products, an increasing share of which are outside of the textiles and apparel sectors. Data collected from the WTO and reported in Bown (2007) Is there historical evidence that discriminatory trade restrictions imposed on China have disrupted trade flows via trade deflection? To investigate this question we examine the impact of discriminatory trade policies on Chinese product-level exports over its pre-accession 1992-2001 period. We focus on U.S. and EU imposition of product-specific, discriminatory import restrictions. 8 As table 1 indicates, one motivation for focusing on the U.S. and EU is that they are two of China's four largest destination markets for its exports. If China's exporters are able to deflect trade, these are two of the markets from which we expect trade deflection to derive. 9 Moreover, our focus on the effect of U.S. and 5 The standard safeguard investigation requires evidence of injury (or threat thereof) caused by increased imports.
Antidumping (countervailing duty) investigations also require evidence of less than fair value pricing (illegal export subsidies) in addition to the evidence of injury caused by imports. For a discussion of the general role of safeguards in the WTO, see Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) . 6 8 In what follows below, for convenience we may refer to the EU as a "country" since it invokes a singular trade policy stance toward Union non-members such as China. 9 Furthermore, we believe there are good reasons to be less interested in focusing on two other primary export markets for China -Hong Kong and Japan -as the "triggers" for the trade deflection. While Hong Kong was technically EU discriminatory trade policies is motivated by data requirements. Both the U.S. and EU utilize discriminatory, antidumping import restrictions and publish very detailed, product-level information on these policies. Using newly collected data on policy impositions at the product level (Bown, 2005) allows us to directly identify evidence of trade deflection associated with such measures. 10 Furthermore, as most of these products are in the steel (metals) and chemicals industries, and it is even more rare
China's largest export market in 1997, much of China's exports sent to Hong Kong are never intended for consumption, but instead for processing and re-export to other markets (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004) . Furthermore, while Japan is China's third largest export market and a potential additional country to investigate, Japan has rarely used antidumping historically. 10 Since China was not a WTO member during the sample period under investigation, even the mere attempt to track other (non-U.S., non-EU) countries' imposition of new import restrictions against China at the product level is extremely difficult, given that such policies were neither restricted by the WTO nor were countries required to report to the WTO the trade policies imposed against China. 11 An antidumping measure would be less discriminatory than a China safeguard if there were multiple exporters targeted in a multi-country investigation of the same product. Hansen and Prusa (1996) that the impositions occur in the same (or even adjacent) years.
With respect to our econometric investigation and results, perhaps surprisingly, we find no systematic evidence that U.S. or EU antidumping restrictions deflected Chinese exports to secondary markets over the 1992-2001 period. We examine the potential impact of contemporaneous as well as lagged effects of such policies, and we employ two distinct econometric approaches. Not only is there no evidence of trade deflection to these markets, there is some weak evidence of a reduction in the relative growth of Chinese exports of these targeted products to secondary markets. One interpretation is that this evidence is consistent with a global "chilling effect" of U.S. and EU antidumping on Chinese exports to alternative markets: i.e., Chinese exporters may be learning that certain products are in politically sensitive sectors and choosing to slow down their export expansion in these prod- 12 identifies reciprocity and MFN as some of the weakest rules necessary for countries to rely on to negotiate an efficiency-enhancing trade agreement initially and to sustain the agreement over time in the face of political and economic shocks. From this perspective, our results raise the question of any political-economic benefit to inclusion of the trade deflection provision, when easy access to the new China safeguard generated by this provision imposes costs via risks to the sustainability of the WTO.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details our empirical approach and the related literature. Section 3 describes the data used in the estimation, and section 4 presents our results and 12 While much of the initial work in this area is contained in Bagwell and Staiger (2002) , other recent papers also examine the roles of MFN and reciprocity as they relate to issues surrounding the accession of a substantial trading partner. For example, the principles combine to form a first line of defense against 'bilateral opportunism,' or the value of a concession won by one country in an earlier negotiation being eroded due to the outcome of a subsequent set of negotiations to which it is not party (Bagwell and Staiger, 2005) . Furthermore, the principles can also be combined to facilitate multilaterally efficient outcomes, even when trade policy negotiations occur bilaterally and sequentially (Bagwell and Staiger, 2004) .
basic robustness checks using a difference-in-difference estimation approach. In section 5 we provide a last sensitivity analysis using an alternative, instrumental variables estimation approach. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Model and Estimation
The empirical investigation
Our empirical analysis is motivated by a three country theoretical model in Bown and Crowley (2007) which to the second country (B) when the first country (A) imposes a country-specific tariff on imports from country B. While it will not be the focus of empirical investigation here, the model also predicts "trade destruction," i.e., that country A's import tariff against country B will result in a fall in A's imports from country B. Lastly, the model predicts "trade creation through import source diversion" or, more succinctly "trade diversion," i.e., that country A's imports from country C will rise (Viner, 1950) .
In this paper, we estimate an augmented gravity model of China's (country B's) product-level exports to 38 trading partners (countries C) which has been adapted to estimate the effects of U.S. and EU (countries A) imposition of product-level antidumping duties. For clarity of exposition, ignoring China's other trading partners, what effects on trade flows might we expect when the country imposing the tariff is the U.S. and the foreign countries are Japan (country C) and China (country B)? First, if the U.S. imposes a country-specific tariff against China in the form of an antidumping duty and imposes no tariff against Japan, we might expect deflected trade, an increase in Chinese exports to Japan. Second, if the U.S. imposes a country-specific tariff against Japan in the form of an antidumping duty, but not against China, we might expect that Chinese exports to Japan will fall, i.e., depressed trade. In this case, Japanese exports that are diverted away from the U.S. market by the tariff and sold domestically within Japan depress Japanese imports from China.
The empirical model
In light of the WTO rules on the China safeguard, our primary interest is identifying trade deflection, an increase in China's exports to some country i in response to a trade restriction imposed by another country such as the U.S. or EU. We begin with a basic gravity specification for China's exports to country i that incorporates trade policy changes introduced by the U.S. and EU on their own imports from China. Ultimately we utilize two different econometric approaches to estimating trade deflection.
Each approach relies on a different source of variation in the data to obtain identification and, thus, speaks to the robustness of our results.
To begin, assume that China's exports to country i of a 6-digit HS product h in year t can be written as a standard gravity model,
where x ciht denotes exports from China to country i of 6-digit HS product h in year t, a ih is country i's time-invariant propensity to import good h (e.g., time-invariant trade barriers, transportation costs, distance, culture, etc.), a ht is a time-varying cost or productivity shock to good h, a it represents country i's time-varying aggregate variables (e.g., GDP, the exchange rate, aggregate demand for imports), and a ct represents China's time-varying aggregate variables (e.g., GDP, the exchange rate, aggregate supply of exports). The τ 's in equation (1) are the trade policy changes that might impact China's exports to country i. Their first subscript indicates the country against which the restrictive trade policy is imposed, the second subscript indicates the country imposing the trade restriction, the third subscript denotes the product h, and the fourth subscript denotes the year j. Specifically, we include: the U.S. import tariff on good h exported from China (τ U S c,ushj ), the EU import tariff on good h exported from China (τ EU c,euhj ), the U.S. import tariff on good h exported from country i (τ U S i,ushj ), the EU import tariff on good h exported from country i (τ EU i,euhj ), and country i's import tariff on good h exported from China (τ i c,iht ). Finally, it may be the case that the impact of a change in a tariff on trade flows to secondary markets occurs only after a time delay. Thus we allow for current trade flows to be affected by both the contemporaneous (j = t) imposition of a new trade restriction, as well as trade policy changes of up to two lags (j = t − 1, t − 2).
In equation (1), the coefficients β 1j (β 2j ) and β 3j (β 4j ) for j = t−2, t−1, t identify trade deflection and trade depression associated with U.S. (EU) antidumping duties, respectively. If the imposition of a U.S. (EU) antidumping duty against China is associated with an increase in China's exports to a secondary market, we expect that β 1j (β 2j ) will be greater than zero. Furthermore, estimates of β 3j (β 4j ) that are less than zero indicate trade depression; i.e., the imposition of a U.S. (EU) antidumping duty against country i is associated with a decrease in China's exports to that secondary market.
The greatest econometric concerns in estimating trade deflection and trade depression in equation (1) are the potential endogeneity of the tariffs and the relationship between a change in a tariff and any underlying cost or productivity shock affecting a particular 6-digit HS good. With regard to the tariffs, it seems reasonable to assume that the U.S. and EU antidumping duties are set independently vis-à-vis China's exports to some third country i. Moreover, the correlation between U.S. and EU trade policy changes against China in our sample is a very low 0.0006 suggesting that the U.S. and EU only rarely, if ever, respond to a common cost or technology shock in China. Despite this evidence against the concern that trade policy is responding to a common Chinese technology shock at the 6-digit HS level, we still want to carefully control for product-level shocks so that our estimates of the coefficients β 1j through β 4j can be interpreted as treatment effects of the policy change.
Difference-in-difference model to estimate trade deflection
Our first approach identifies trade deflection by utilizing variation within a 6-digit HS product across two exporting countries. First, rewrite an analog to equation (1) in which the exporter, China, is replaced with a subscript d to denote a different exporting country with exporting characteristics (described below) similar to China. Then we take the time difference of (1) for China as well as the time difference of the analog equation for exporter d, and we difference those two equations.
Under the assumption that importing country i's trade policy is constant over the time period under consideration, 13 we then have:
The variable ∆x ciht (∆x diht ) denotes the growth of Chinese (country d) exports of h to country i at time t where ∆x ciht ≡ x ciht −x ciht−1 (x ciht +x ciht−1 )/2 in our basic specifications. This average measure of the growth rate of exports, used by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), allows us to include observations of zero trade in our estimation sample. Specifically, this measure caps the growth rate of trade between t − 1 and t at +200% when there is entry into a market and -200% when there is exit from a market.
Including observations of China's entry (and exit) into specific markets is important in our empirical work because we wish to understand if China, as a developing country, is also able to deflect its exports to new markets when it faces trade restrictions that may be shutting it out of the U.S. or EU markets. Nevertheless, so as to check the robustnsess of our results, we also include specifications that use conventional log growth rate measures ∆x ciht ≡ lnx ciht − lnx ciht−1 , omitting all observations on entry and exit by construction. Next, we use year dummies to control for aggregate shocks in China When implementing the model on a sample of data, we choose India as 'country d' for a number of reasons. As we detail below, India has considerable similarities with China when it comes to export structure (both by commodity and by destination market), export growth during this time period, and it is also an important target of both U.S. and EU use of antidumping.
The coefficients β 1j and β 2j for j = t − 2, t − 1, t identify trade deflection associated with U.S. and EU antidumping duties. If the imposition of a U.S. antidumping duty against China is associated with an increase in China's exports relative to India's (country d's) exports, we expect that β 1j will be greater than zero. Similarly, if an increase in the U.S. antidumping duty against India induces Indian trade deflection, we expect India's exports to market i to rise relative to China's exports to i, yielding a positive coefficient on β 1j . The same reasoning implies that trade deflection associated with an EU antidumping measure will yield an estimate of β 2j that is positive.
Note, however, that one implication of this particular difference-in-difference approach is that we cannot identify β 3j and β 4j -i.e., trade depression -from equation (2) . We therefore introduce a framework for estimating trade depression separately in the next section.
Finally, while equation (2) forms our baseline specification, as a robustness check we also estimate a variant of the model to examine the possibility of "aggregate deflection" by China and India (country d) to all markets other than the U.S. and EU. Specifically, in this particular sensitivity analysis we sum Chinese exports to China's top 41 trading partners less the U.S., EU and India (country d) for each product in year t (x row cht ). Similarly, in accordance with our difference-in-difference strategy, we sum India's (country d's) exports to those same (China's top 41) trading partners less the U.S., and the EU for each product h in each year t (x row dht ). We then estimate an aggregated analog to equation (2) given by
We also expect that aggregate trade deflection associated with U.S. and EU duties will be associated with positive coefficient estimates of β 1j and β 2j .
Difference-in-difference model of trade depression
We use a similar difference-in-difference approach to estimate trade depression. To fix ideas once again, we are interested in the question of whether China's exports to a secondary country market fall if that country's own exports of a 6-digit HS product are subject to a U.S. or EU antidumping trade restriction. In order to obtain identification in this case, we utilize variation in China's exports to two different countries that faced U.S. and EU antidumping restrictions between 1992-2001.
Taking the time difference of (1) for two separate export markets, we write the difference between
China's export growth to countries i and k as:
where variables are defined as in (2), and we use year dummies to control for aggregate variation in countries i and k. The coefficients β 3j and β 4j for j = t − 2, t − 1, t identify potential trade depression associated with U.S. and EU trade policies. Trade depression, a decline in China's exports to countries i or k in the face of an antidumping measure, would imply estimates of β 3j and β 4j that are less than zero.
Note, finally, that there are two subtle differences between equations (3) and (2). First, with respect to Chinese exports to two different countries, even a China-specific 6-digit HS productivity shock falls out of the expression, so the restrictiveness of the assumption about time-varying productivity is less stringent in equation (2) . Second, equation (3) implicitly assumes that tariff policies by countries i and k are constant over the time period under consideration. In order to estimate equation (3), we choose countries that infrequently changed their own tariffs over the sample period.
For reasons we detail below, we estimate equation (3) on relative Chinese export growth to Japan (i) and Korea (k).
Variable Construction and Data
In this section we discuss the construction of variables used in the estimation. Tables 5 and 6 present summary statistics for the primary data used in the estimation.
Trade variables
The dependent variables in the estimation of equations (2) First consider the dependent variable in the estimation of equation (2), the difference between the annual growth of China's exports to 38 different countries i of commodity h and India's exports of the same commodities to the same countries. In choosing India as 'country d' in equation (2) 
U.S. and EU antidumping policy variables
The main explanatory variables of interest are the changes to U.S. and EU import policy facing a commodity h exported from China or from another country. Our estimates use the level of duties imposed by the U.S. and by the EU. For EU cases that result in price undertakings, we use reported dumping margins to proxy for the magnitude of the policy change. 15 The information on U.S. and EU measures imposed at the product level derives from a newly compiled data source (Bown, 2005) . 16 For the case of the U.S. (EU) antidumping, the information in the dataset has been collected from original source government publications such as the Federal
Register (Official Journal of the European Communities), where we are able to track the dates of 15 In unreported results, we have also separated antidumping cases that end in duties versus those that end in price undertakings, and this does not affect our results. 16 See the publicly available 'Global Antidumping Database,' at http://www.brandeis.edu/˜cbown/global ad/ .
investigations, measures imposed, countries affected, and 6-digit HS products that were targeted.
Our estimation examines the export growth path for products targeted by an antidumping measure for multiple years around the policy's actual imposition. For both U.S. and EU antidumping measures examined in the estimation, we identify the focal year t as the initiation year of the antidumping investigation, as opposed to the year the final measure was actually imposed, though frequently they will be the same. One motivation for this choice is that there has been evidence in prior research that even antidumping investigations that do not end in imposed measures can have a destructive effect on imports, due to the uncertainty as to the final disposition of the case (Staiger and Wolak, 1994) .
Nevertheless, we expect that this decision could lead us to estimate a differential impact of Chinese export growth with respect to the timing of U.S. versus EU measures, and in some specifications we therefore allow for the lagged imposition of policies (t − 1, t − 2) to affect contemporaneous export growth. robust evidence of statistically significant deflection. In fact, rather than an increase in exports to third markets, U.S. antidumping duties may be associated with a "chilling" effect on Chinese exports to such alternative markets. With respect to EU trade policy, the only economically and statistically significant finding is a chilling effect associated with EU duties on steel products.
Our baseline specification (1) examines the response of the difference between China's and India's yearly growth of the volume of trade to the contemporaneous initiation of an AD investigation that resulted in duties imposed by the U.S. and EU against China and/or India, respectively. At this short time horizon, the difference between the within-year policy changes against China and India has no effect on the difference in the growth of the volume of exports to alternative markets. Given that it could take over a year for a U.S. or EU antidumping investigation to result in the imposition of a definitive import restriction, the finding of no contemporaneous response in not entirely surprising.
Our second specification (2) utilizes the same dependent variable, but includes lags of the difference in the change in the U.S. and EU duties, respectively. We include lags in case the full impact of a new antidumping restriction is not felt until the full administrative process (or perhaps even longer)
is completed. Furthermore, the timing of the effect of U.S. versus EU policies could vary because of differences in their administrative structures, the likelihood that preliminary measures are imposed earlier on in the investigation, etc. In this specification, we find that at one lag, an increase in the U.S. duty against China (or India) is associated with a reduction in the growth rate of Chinese (or Indian) exports to third countries relative to the growth rate of Indian (or Chinese) exports. We interpret this as evidence of a potential chilling effect of the U.S. policy on Chinese exports to alternative markets.
In terms of the magnitude of the estimates reported in specification (2), a 1% increase in the duty against China is associated with the difference in the mean export growth rates between China and India narrowing by 0.302 percentage points. In our sample, mean growth for Chinese exports over this period was 16.2% while mean growth for Indian exports was 11.9%. Thus, raising the duty against
China by 1% is associated with a decline in the differential of the average growth rate of exports between the two countries from roughly 4.3% (=16.2% -11.9%) to 4.0%. If the U.S. were to apply the conditional mean duty against China in the sample (125%), this would imply a 20 percentage point reduction in Chinese export growth relative to Indian export growth of the same product.
Proceding across specifications, in column (3) we redefine the dependent variable to be the difference in the growth rates of the value of exports and find that our estimates are robust. A 1% increase in a U.S. AD duty against one country leads that country's export growth to be 0.3 percentage points lower in the year after initiation of the AD investigation that resulted in a duty. In column (4), we
replace the Davis and Haltiwanger definition for the growth rate of exports (used in construction of the dependent variable) with the standard log growth rate measure. This measure, by construction, omits all observations in which China or India enters or exits a particular country's import market in a given year. We find that the estimate of chilling associated with a U.S. AD duty at a lag of one
year is again robust, suggesting our results are not sensitive to allowing for entry and exit.
Turning to column (5) of (3) . In the aggregated growth specification we find a slightly stonger chilling effect; a 1 percent increase in the U.S. AD duty against China or India is associated with a growth rate for the targeted country that is 0.41 percentage points lower than the non-targeted country in the year following initiation of an investigation that resulted in a duty.
Column (6) presents our final specification which is the effect of U.S. and EU antidumping duties on a subsample of steel products (HS chapters 72 and 73). Because the steel industry is an active user of antidumping trade restrictions, we might be concerned that the estimated effects are driven entirely by steel products. Nevertheless, our restricted steel sample indicates no statistically significant effect of U.S. antidumping duties, but there is evidence of a chilling effect associated with EU antidumping measures in the year after the AD investigation is initiated. For this subsample of products, the magnitude of the chilling effect of an EU antidumping duty is slightly larger -a 1 percent increase in the duty against one country is associated with the growth rate for the targeted country being 0.93 percentage points lower than that of the non-targeted country.
Thus, while there is no evidence of trade deflection, there is some evidence that U.S. and EU antidumping measures are associated with these targeted Chinese and Indian products slowing down their export growth to secondary markets. One explanation for the "chilling effect" result could be that it is self-imposed -i.e., that Chinese or Indian exporters recognize through the U.S. and EU policy that these products are in politically sensitive product categories. Therefore, in the hope that they might avoid such import restrictions in secondary markets as well, the exporters take it upon themselves to curtail their export growth. Nevertheless, this is only one interpretation, as we cannot rule out the possibility that this chilling effect is the result of the secondary market imposing its own import restrictions. We would only be able to address this distinction by having access to data that would fully control for any product-level changes in trade policy on Chinese imports into these other (i.e., non-U.S., non-EU) markets, a difficult endeavor given the lack of data reporting requirements vis-à-vis China during the pre-WTO accession period of the sample, as we described in the introduction. We do note, however, that alternative markets such as Japan and South Korea that did report use of antidumping to the WTO during this time period targeted China with AD actions in products that were different from those targeted by the U.S. and EU.
Difference-in-difference estimates of trade depression
While there is evidence of a "chilling" effect of U.S. and EU antidumping policies on Chinese exports to third markets, is there evidence that when the U.S. and EU impose such policies on third countries that there is also a trade depressing effect on Chinese exports? Table 9 presents our results on trade depression for Chinese exports to Japan and Korea in the face of those two countries being hit with U.S. and EU antidumping. We find strong evidence that the imposition of U.S. antidumping duties against Japan and Korea is associated with a large, economically and statistically significant decline in Chinese exports to Japan and Korea.
Beginning with column (7), our baseline specification uses the difference in the growth of the volume of Chinese exports to Japan and Korea as the dependent variable. We find that a 1% increase in the U.S. AD duty against Japan or Korea is associated with the growth of Chinese exports to the targeted country being roughly 1.5 percentage points lower than growth to the non-targeted country.
In contrast we find no evidence of depression associated with EU AD duties. This economically large depression effect of U.S. antidumping is robust across specifications using the different dependent variable. Column (8) presents a similar result when we add lags of the change in the duty. Column (9) reports a somewhat larger effect when we redefine the dependent variable to be the difference in the value of export growth. In column (10) we use a log growth measure in order to eliminate observations on entry and exit. The contemporaneous effect of the depression result still exists, though it is moderated by relative export growth two years later. Lastly, column (11) restricts our sample steel products and finds that the magnitude of the coefficient is roughly equal to the coefficient in the sample of all products, suggesting that the effect in steel products is similar to that in non-steel products.
We estimate, but do not report, some additional specifications to help us understand and interpret the magnitude of our depression result. First, we observe that entry and, especially, exit by Chinese exporters from specific markets do not drive our results. To check our results from the log growth measure specification (10), we re-estimate specification (9) but drop all observations of Chinese export growth to Japan or Korea that have a value of +/-2 (indicating entry and exit). For this specification, our estimate of the effect of the difference in a change in the U.S. duty on product h in year t increases slightly in absolute value relative to specification (9) to -2.02 (standard error=.818) from -1.98.
Second, we observe that depression is primarily driven by U.S. AD activity against Japan. A few statistics bring this into view. In our sample of 29474 observations, we have only 16 antidumping duties imposed by the U.S. against Korea, but 42 imposed against Japan. 17 Moreover, when we look at the mean growth rates of Chinese exports to Korea and Japan conditional upon a U.S.
antidumping duty, we find that Chinese exports to Korea are higher while Chinese exports to Japan are substantially lower. 17 To clarify, although the U.S. imposed antidumping measures on roughly 95 (120) different 6-digit HS export products from Korea (Japan) during this time period, Korea (Japan) only imported 16 (42) of these same products from China.
Third, we have performed a number of industry-specific regressions which indicate that depression
is driven by a variety of products for which Japan faced antidumping duties over a number of years.
Fourth, because two products, ferro-silicon/silico-manganese (HS=720230) and temporary lighters (HS=961310) were subject to antidumping investigations in different years by Japan, Korea, the U.S. and EU, we re-estimated all of our depression specifications in the absence of observations on these products. Our estimates were identical to those reported in table 4 to one decimal place. 18 Lastly, to better understand the magnitude of our depression coefficient, we calculate the mean change in the level of the value of Chinese exports to Japan, conditional on a U.S. AD duty being imposed. We find that Chinese exports to Japan fall by about U.S.$1 million when the U.S. imposes an AD duty on its imports from Japan. In our dataset, aggregate Chinese exports to Japan rise from alternative model that relies more on cross-sectional variation across 6-digit products and countries to obtain identification. This has some similarities to the approach taken in Bown and Crowley (2007) . 19 In this alternative approach, we start with the time difference of (1):
18 Japan reported initiating an AD investigation on imports of ferro-silicon (HS=720230) from China in 1991. The U.S. imposed an antidumping restriction on the same 6-digit product in 1993, the EU in 1996 and Korea in 1997. The EU restricted imports of temporary lighters (HS=961310) from China in 1990 and Korea restricted imports of the same product in 1997. 19 
where we assume that country i's trade policy toward China is constant over the time period under investigation. Then, we use 6-digit product fixed effects and lagged export growth to proxy for time-varying cost or productivity shocks at the product level. Our estimating equation is then:
where in estimating we apply the instumental variables techniques of Hsiao (1981, 1982) because the autocorrelation of the dependent variable implies that least squares estimation yields biased estimates. 20 In the estimation, we instrument for the lagged growth rate, ∆x ciht−1 , with the second lag of the log level of exports, ln(x ciht−2 ) if x ciht−2 > 1 and a value of zero if the second lag of the level of exports is less than 1. 21
By utilizing 6-digit HS product fixed effects in (5) we control for changes in production costs or technology that imply that a particular good h will have a growth rate for exports that is higher or lower than average. Note that commodities with very high average growth rates also tend to be those most likely to be targeted for antidumping measures. As in equations (2) and (3) we use year dummies to control for all aggregate variation in China and country i over time.
For estimating equation (5), we calculate annual export growth of China's exports to 38 different countries i listed in table 1, excluding the U.S., EU and India. 20 An alternative approach such as the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator which utilizes multiple lags of the level of the dependent variable as an instrument for the lagged growth rate is not computationally feasible in our estimation because of the large number of parameters in (5) . 21 Because the bias associated with using a weak instrument may be large, we test the quality of our instrument.
First-stage restricted and unrestricted regressions are reported in table A-1 for our baseline specification. For all specifications, the F-statistics of roughly 312,000 are far larger than the 99% critical χ 2 (1) of 6.63. We conclude that the second lag of the log level of exports is a strong instrument for the lagged growth rate. (14), we estimate a chilling effect that is similar in magnitude but which is not statistically significant at standard confidence levels. Part of the explanation for this result is the additional observations added to the sample when we switch to values from volumes, as the COMTRADE data reports many observations for Chinese export values that do not include a volume counterpart.
Instrumental variables estimates of trade deflection and trade depression
In specification (15), we redefine the dependent variable to be the log growth of the value of exports, and in (16) we redefine it to be the Davis-Haltiwanger growth of the value of exports aggregated across the 38 markets in our sample. Both specifications also yield chilling estimates at one lag, a 1% duty implies roughly a 0.10 and 0.15% reduction in export growth, respectively. The last specification, (17) , restricts the sample to steel exports and finds evidence consistent with our difference-in-difference estimates of table 8, i.e., there is no statistically significant evidence of deflection or chilling associated with U.S. imposition of antidumping on Chinese steel.
The next set of estimates in table 10 suggest evidence of a contemporaneous chilling effect of an EU antidumping duty against imports from China on Chinese exports to third countries. This differs slightly from our difference-in-difference estimates presented in table 8 which found no statistically significant relationship between EU antidumping and Chinese exports to third countries. Across the 6 specifications in table 10, estimates of the magnitude of the effect range from a low of a 0.17% fall in the growth of the value of Chinese exports to a high of a 0.52% fall in the value of Chinese exports of steel products when the EU increases its duty by 1%. For the regression on steel products (column 17), although the timing is slightly different, the relative size of the result vis-à-vis the estimate on the full sample of products is in line with the estimates from our difference-in-difference model.
In order to understand the differences between the results of our difference-in-difference model and our IV panel model, we can also examine the sources of variation in the data that identify the deflection/chilling effect for EU AD duties. In the difference-in-difference model of trade deflection, identification comes from variation between Chinese and Indian growth rates within a product. However, EU antidumping measures are highly correlated across China and India, especially for steel. The A simple explanation for the lack of trade depression in the IV panel model can be found by re-estimating the specification in column (13) on a restricted sample of Chinese exports to Japan and Korea only. In this smaller sample we do observe contemporaneous trade depression, consistent with our difference-in-difference estimates reported in table 9. This suggests that Japan and Korea are unusual among China's export partners and that the phenonomenon of trade depression is likely limited to the few countries that face very high antidumping duties emanating from the U.S. and EU.
Puzzles and Potential Explanations
A number of potentially complementary explanations are consistent with our results that Chinese exporters did not deflect trade during the 1992-2001 period. First, it could be that the Chinese products hit with U.S. and EU antidumping measures are primarily the function of export platform activity that can easily be disassembled and relocated to another country. It could also be that some of the products are highly differentiated with specifications designed (by U.S. or EU retailers) for one particular export market. Or it could be that these other WTO members were applying higher (non-MFN) tariffs against China during its pre-accession period that China was not able to penetrate.
Finally, it could relate to the fact that as a "new" entrant into the global economy, Chinese firms did not yet have the networks over the 1992-2001 period to deflect trade to alternate markets, perhaps not yet having paid the market-specific fixed cost of entry.
Regardless of the explanation, our result of "missing" trade deflection is puzzling given that there was such concern about the phenomenon among the WTO membership that China's terms of accession include a safeguard to pre-emptively control it.
Conclusion
China Our results do raise a number of policy concerns. One derives from a comparison of the results in this paper and the empirical evidence of trade deflection from studies of developed countries (e.g., Bown and Crowley, 2007) . Developing country exporters may face an additional cost to antidumping if they are unable to deflect trade and recoup some of their losses. 22 This could suggest that the failure to reform antidumping in the Doha Round is even more detrimental to developing countries than had previously been considered.
The lack of historical evidence of Chinese trade deflection presents a potential additional con- 22 For example, we found China did not deflect steel exports whereas Japan did deflect steel exports in the face of U.S. antidumping measures. Thus, the lack of trade deflection by developing countries is not simply a product-level phenomenon determined solely by the differences in the countries' export baskets. Notes: data compiled by the authors based on Bown (2005) . † 'Unique' relates to the fact that some 6-digit HS products may have been investigated or hit with an antidumping measure more than once during the 12 year sample. Notes: † Subscript h is a 6-digit HS product, and t is a year, the growth rate is defined using the Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) measure described in the text and is thus bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry). In parentheses are standard errors, with ***, **, and * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Notes: † Subscript h is a 6-digit HS product, and t is a year, the growth rate is defined using the Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) measure described in the text and is thus bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry). In parentheses are standard errors, with ***, **, and * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Other Controls
Instruments for growth of China's exports of h to country i in t- Notes: † Subscript h is a 6-digit HS product, and t is a year, the growth rate is defined using the Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) measure described in the text and is thus bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry). In parentheses are White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for clusters defined on the variable defined as the 6-digit HS product and year combination. ***, **, and * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Explanatory Variables
Unrestricted first stage regression (13) Restricted first stage regression (13) Notes: † Subscript h is a 6-digit HS product, and t is a year, the growth rate is defined using the Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) measure described in the text and is thus bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry). In parentheses are White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for clusters defined on the variable defined as the 6-digit HS product and year combination. ***, **, and * denote variables statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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